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The Internal Senses in Nemesius, Plotinus and Galen: The Beginning of an Idea 
Muhammad U. Faruque 
This study traces the notion of the internal senses in three ancient authors, namely Nemesius, Plotinus and 
Galen. It begins with Nemesius, and then by going backward ends with Galen. The textual evidence 
investigated in this study shows clearly that Galen, after acknowledging the Platonic tripartite soul, 
locates the various dunameis of the soul in the brain. The “localization” theory of Galen plays a crucial 
role in paving the way for the foundation of the internal senses, which both Plotinus and Nemesius 
adopted. Just as with the external senses one can locate various sense-organs in different parts of the 
body, viz., touch, smell, sight etc., so too with the internal senses, one is able to locate them in various 
parts of the brain. Thus philosophers are able to explain the role of all these different (internal) senses in 
their account of sense-perception. 
1. Introduction
The internal senses—as they are so called—were an integral part of both Medieval and 
Ancient philosophy, especially as they relate to epistemology (perception) and psychology 
(faculties of the soul).  Although the first explicit coinage of the term occurred in St. Augustine, 
the theory of the internal sense retained its relevance as late as in Kant, for whom the distinction 
between “inner sense” (innere Sinn) and “apperception” (Apperzeption) is axiomatic in his Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason). 1 In the present endeavor, however, attempts will
1 Kant makes a crucial distinction between inner sense and the pure apperception (self-consciousness) of 
the “I think” or cogito. Apperception is the term originally used by Leibniz in his New Essays Concerning 
Human Understanding (published posthumously in 1765) from the French s'apercevoir de, meaning ‘to 
be aware of.’ According to Kant, the perceptions of inner sense have no transcendental reference unlike 
the transcendental subject of the “I think”. The latter is the spontaneous source of synthesis, while the 
former, as a sense, is passive and receptive. In Kantian epistemology, as presented in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, all representations are subject to the synthetic unity of apperception. That is to say, the cogito (I 
think) must be able to accompany all the representations for otherwise something would be represented in 
the subject which could not be thought of in the first place (CPR B153-4). [Immanuel Kant 
(1781/1787), Critique of Pure Reason, P. Guyer and A. Wood (trans.), (Cambridge and NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). References to CPR are in the standard pagination of the 1st (A) and 2nd (B) 
editions.] See also H. A. Wolfson, “The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophical 
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be made to trace the foundation of the internal senses in three ancient philosophers, namely 
Nemesius, Plotinus, and Galen. It will be argued, in the course of our analysis, that although 
explicit mention of the term may be lacking in the writings of these figures, their discussion of 
the various faculties (dunameis) of the soul laid the cornerstone of the theory of the internal 
senses that became important in subsequent philosophical traditions. We will begin with 
Nemesius of Emesa, a Christian bishop active in the late fourth century AD, who composed an 
important treatise On the Nature of Man, in which clear traces of the discussion of the internal 
senses can be discerned. Then, working backward, we will proceed to investigate how Nemesius’ 
formulation might have been influenced and informed by two earlier thinkers, namely Plotinus 
and Galen. However, before diving into the actual texts of the authors in question, an explanation 
of the term “internal senses” is in order.  
       The “internal senses” (La. sensus interiores) are a collection of mental faculties which 
ancient philosophers located in the brain, and to which they assigned the various functions which 
were associated with the imagination2 (phantasia) and the common sense (koine-aisthesis; Latin
sensus communis) throughout Aristotle’s De anima and Parva naturalia. In general, the internal 
senses refer to the post-sensationary faculties that operate without bodily organs.3
      It would be instructive, at this stage, to delineate the epistemic justification (why distinct 
faculties are necessary to explain internal perception) of the internal senses, since doing so will 
clarify its broader context. One of the better formulations of the notion of the internal senses can 
be found in the works of the great medieval philosopher Avicenna (d. 1037), hence we will 
briefly touch upon his account of them. Avicenna invokes three epistemological principles in 
order to deduce the number of internal senses:4
Texts,” The Harvard Theological Review 28, no. 2 (1935): 128 and Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of 
Knowledge (Cambridge and NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 131ff. 
2 Phantasia is rendered imagination, but at times it would be helpful to translate it as “representation.” 
3 See, e.g. Wolfson, The Internal Senses, 69. For an alternative definition of the internal senses (based on 
first-order and second order perceptions), see Thomas K. Johansen, In Defense of Inner Sense: Aristotle 
on Perceiving that One Sees, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 7 (2005): 
23.   
4 Avicenna, al-Shifāʾ: Fī al-nafs I.5, 43-45 in Fazlur Rahman (ed.), Avicenna’s De anima (Arabic text). 
Being the Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifāʾ (London: Oxford University Press: 1959). See also 
Debora L. Black, “Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations,” Topoi, 
19 (2000) 59–75, and ‘Estimation (wahm) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions,’ 
Dialogue 32: 219–258; D. N. Hasse, ‘Avicenna on Abstraction,’ in R. Wisnovsky (ed.), Aspects of 
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1. Each distinct type of sensible object requires a distinct faculty in order to be perceived. The
post-sensationary objects of cognition include two such distinct types of objects, the forms of the 
common sensibles (Ar. suwar al-maḥsūsāt) and the “inherent meaning” of those sensibles (Ar. 
maʿānī al-maḥsūsāt). 
2. Since passivity and activity are mutually exclusive, active and passive relations to an object
require two respective faculties. 
3. Receptive and retentive faculties are distinguished because of different material qualities
required in their respective organs. Thus the same faculty cannot both receive and retain a 
sensible object, which means there must two different faculties.  
The application of the above criteria, according to Avicenna, yields a system of five faculties: 
1. common sense (Ar. al-ḥiss al-mushtarak): reception of forms
2. receptive imagination (Ar. khayāl) or the formative faculty: retention of forms
3. estimation (Ar. wahm): reception of meanings
4. memory (dhikr) or the retentive faculty: retention of meanings
5. active imagination (Ar. al-quwwa al-mutakhayyila) or cogitation (Ar. fikr): separation and
combination of forms and meanings.5
It is to be noted that Avicenna, like his ancient counterparts such as Nemesius,6 located the
internal senses in different parts of the brain: the common sense and receptive imagination in the 
front part of the brain; the active imagination and estimation in the middle part, and memory in 
the rear part of the brain.  In what follows, we will analyze the description of the internal senses 
in the three above-mentioned figures, and attempt to draw a comparative summary. 
2. Nemesius: the Faculties of the Soul and their Bodily Instruments
The subject matter of Nemesius’ treatise On the Nature of Man is the nature of human beings 
and their place in the larger of scheme of the universe. The treatise encompasses a wide range of 
topics from the physiological functioning of humans to the question of their providential concern 
Avicenna (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2001), 39-72; Henrik Lagerlund (ed.), Forming the 
Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical 
Enlightenment (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007); passim.  
5 Avicenna, al-Shifāʾ: fī al-nafs I.5, 44-45. For alternative classifications in Avicenna, see Wolfson, The 
Internal Senses, 276-82. 
6 For Galen’s view on this see section IV of this essay. 
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as decreed by God. Nemesius wrote mainly in the Christian context of the fourth century AD, 
although he often engages in debate with the pagans, in addition to fellow Christians of the era. 
He makes extensive use of Greek philosophical sources in such a way that his text is not only 
evidence for the pagan debates but also a contribution to them in its own right. The 
anatomical/psychological writings of Galen and the standard corpus of Plato, Aristotle, and some 
Neoplatonists such as Porphyry are all major influence on Nemesius.7 He also takes stock of
Plotinus’ views on the soul.8
     Nemesius claims that the body is the instrument of the soul, and it is divided in accordance 
with the faculties (dunameis) of the soul. He enumerates the faculties of the soul as the 
following: imagination, thought, and memory. And he explains “imagination” in the following:  
Imagination (to phantastikon) is a faculty (dunamis) of the non-rational part of the soul that acts through 
the sense-organs. The imagined is that which is the object of imagination, as the sensed is the object of 
sensation. An image is an affection of the non-rational soul that comes about through something 
imagined. An apparition is an empty affection in the non-rational parts of the soul caused by nothing 
imagined… The organs of imagination are the frontal cavities of the brain, the psychic pneuma within 
them, the nerves from them soaked with the psychic pneuma and the apparatus of the sense-organs.9 
For Nemesiuas, as for Galen, the soul is divided into rational and non-rational parts.10 Thus
the imagination belongs to the non-rational part, and it is a faculty that acts as a function of 
sense-perception (aisthesis). Like the Stoics, Nemesius states that the whole process of 
imagination involves four distinct categories:  
1. imagination which is an empty attraction without an imagined object
2. imagined (to phantaston) which is the object imagined
3. the image (phantasia) which is the experience, impression or effect caused by the
imagined object
4. apparition (phantasma) which is an image not caused by an external object but merely a
product of mind11
7 Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, trans. R. W. Sharples and P. J. van der Eijk (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1-3. 
8 Ibid., 1, 35. 
9 Ibid., 6, 100-01. 
10 Ibid., 15, 125ff. 
11 Ibid., 6, 100. For the Stoic classification cf. Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch, Tenets 4.12 (= SVF 2.54), where 
this distinction is attributed to Chrysippus. Nemesius presents some verbal resemblances to this chapter, 
and uses the same tradition (cf. also Pseudo-Galen, Historia philosopha (1914, 4-27).  
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Although Nemesius does not dedicate a separate section on the common-sense, his 
description of perception seems to entail the latter. He states that there are five sense-organs but 
only one sense, that of the soul, which recognizes through the sense-organs the affections that 
occur in them. As he asserts: 
Sensation is not an alteration, but the recognition of an alteration: for the sense-organs are altered and the 
sense recognizes the alteration; often the sense-organs are called senses, but a sensation is a reception12 of 
objects of sense… There is also this [definition of sensation]: a power of the soul to receive objects of 
sense, while a sense-organ is an instrument for the reception of objects of sense.13 
The idea that sensation (or sense-perception) is a receptive activity suggests that there is 
something (i.e. a faculty) that receives sense data through the sense-organs. He also claims that 
this “faculty of the soul,” together with the sense-organs, receives external data through the 
imagination.14 In addition, Nemesius maintains that some faculties of the soul are subordinate in
relation to others. In his view, thought and understanding (to dianoetikon kai to epistemonikon) 
are commanding faculties, while sense, movement according to impulse, and the imagination are 
subordinate faculties as they obey the ruling of “reason” without any delay.15
      After describing the imagination, Nemesius briefly expounds on “thought” as that which 
constitutes judgement, assent, avoidance, and impulse. He says that its organ is the central cavity 
of the brain and the psychic pneuma within the cavity.16 However, at another place, he identifies
thought with reasoning. He then divides reasoning into “immanent” and “expressed reason:” 
12 Reception here is translated as antilepsis.  
13 Ibid., 6, 102-03. The view that sensation is a kind of alteration (alloiosis) is considered somewhat 
vaguely by Aristotle (cf. On the Soul 415b24; 416b34; 417b5ff; On Dreams 459b3-5; On the Parts of 
Animals 641b6), although he also states that it is not an alteration in the full sense of the word (On the 
Soul 417b5ff.). The view that sensation is a recognition or discernment (diagnosis) of alteration is found 
in Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 7.6.30-31, De Lacy trans. 
14 Nemesius, On the Nature 6, 103. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 12, 117. Nemesius distinguishes between to dianoetikon and to epistemonikon, and this perhaps 
corresponds to dianoesis and noesis (attributed to Plato in the same treatise). Noesis has as its objects ‘the 
proper objects of thought,’ which have no basis in sense-perception. The identification of thought with 
judgement, assent etc. is of Stoic origin. Cf. also Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch, Tenets 4.21. See the footnote by 
Sharples et al.  
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Immanent (endiathetos) reason is a motion of the soul which occurs in the speech function without any 
speaking aloud, which is why we often go through a whole reasoning process by ourselves in silence and 
converse in dreams… Expressed (prophorikos) reason has its activity in speech and in conversation.17  
The above division, Nemesius states, is another way of dividing the faculties of the soul 
according to their bodily parts. As it stands, immanent reason refers to the silent discourse that 
everyone is entitled to have with herself, while expressed reason refers to the more social 
function of speech. He then goes on to elaborate on the physiology of “speech,”18 which is
largely adapted from Galen’s On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body. After this, Nemesius 
proceeds to analyze memory (mneme) and its relation to imagination. According to Nemesius, 
the sensibles are the proper objects of memory, while there is also recollection (anamnesis) of 
innate ideas: 
The faculty of memory is the cause and storehouse of memory and recollection. According to Origen, 
memory is the imagination left behind by an actually appearing sensation, according to Plato the 
preservation of sensation and thought. For the soul grasps objects of sense through the sense-organs and 
an opinion is formed, while it grasps things intelligible through the intellect and intellection comes about: 
when the soul preserves the imprints of what it has experienced and of what it has conceived it is said to 
remember.19 
    So the faculty of memory preserves what we have seen, heard, or thought. Nemesius quotes 
both Origen and Plato to suggest that memory concerns the preservation of sensation. He goes on 
to maintain that the proper objects of memory are the sensibles, of which opinion can be formed, 
whereas recollection of the forms is not attained through remembering but through learning and 
“natural intuition.”20 Toward the end of the chapter, Nemesius explains how information flows
from the imagination to reasoning, and then from reasoning to memory. Also, like the faculties 
of imagination and thought, memory is also assigned a physical location in the brain:  
17 Nemesius, On the Nature 14, 123-24. 
18 Galen, On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body 7.5, 7.11, and 7.20, trans. M. T. May. Galen treats the 
physiology of speech in detail, but he also refers there for even more extensive treatment to his work On 
the Voice, which survives only in fragments. See also Galen, On the Affected Parts 1.6 (8.50-53) K and 
4.9 (8.266-68 K), trans. Siegel: “the formation of voice (phone) is the function of the sound organs, but 
the production of speech (dialektos) of the speech organs, the most important of which is the tongue, 
while nose, lips and teeth support speech considerably… the larynx and the muscles which move it are 
phonetic organs, and so are the nerves which conduct the power of the brain to these (parts).” On the 
function of these “nerves” see On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body 7.17. 
19 Nemesius, On the Nature 13, 119-20. 
20 Ibid., 120. This is so because phantasia is not involved in their cognition. 
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 Thus the faculty of imagination hands on things imagined to the faculty of thought, while thought or 
reasoning, when it has received and judged them, passes them on to the faculty of memory. The organ of 
memory, too, is the posterior cavity of the brain, which they call the cerebellum and the enkranis, and the 
psychic pneuma within it.21 
3. Plotinus: there is more to the Soul than its Faculties
In Plotinus’ view, the soul is not in the body; rather the body is in the soul. This way of 
looking at things, as we shall see when we get to Galen, is diametrically opposed to reducing the 
soul to its various faculties, some of whose activities, he would admit, are located in the body.22
True, Plotinus draws on the anatomical findings presented by Galen in his On the Doctrines of 
Hippocrates and Plato, but at the same time he appropriates the latter’s demonstration in such a 
way as to safeguard the unity and incorporeality of the soul.23 Thus, according to him, the parts
of the soul are not “in” the three main bodily organs (i.e. the brain, the heart and the liver) in the 
ordinary sense—only their “activity” takes place there.24 Plotinus avers that the essential
functions of the soul consist in contemplating the forms and finding a paradigm of the sensible 
world in it.25 Thus, it is the logos26 of everything, and its main functions are intellection and
perception respectively. It is within this paradigm that we should seek to explain why the 
Plotinian soul has distinct faculties, with the reasoning faculty securing the top spot. The 
following passage sheds considerable light on this: 
21 Ibid., 121. The notion of “psychic pneuma was first developed in Hellenistic medicine, especially by 
Erasistratus and in Stoic psychological theory, and further systematized by Galen which was adopted by 
Nemesius. Pneuma is believed to flow through the nerves and to mediate sensory and motor signals 
between the sense-organs and the brian. For more information, see the note in Sharples et al (121). For an 
extensive discussion of “pneuma,” see Julius Rocca, “From doubt to certainty. Aspects of the 
conceptualisation and interpretation of Galen’s natural pneuma,” in M. Horstmanshoff, H. King, C. Zittel 
(eds), Blood, Sweat and Tears. The Changing Concepts of Physiology from Antiquity into Early Modern 
Europe (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 629-659. 
22 Plotinus, Enneads 4.3.23 and 4.3.24.25-29, trans. Armstrong. See also Eyjolfur K. Emilsson, Plotinus 
on Sense-Perception: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1988), 34-35. 
23 For an emphasis on this point, see Teun Tieleman, “Plotinus on the seat of the soul: reverberations of 
Galen and Alexander in Enn. IV, 3 [27], 23,” Phronesis 43 (4), 306–325. 
24 Plotinus, Enneads 4.3.23.30-38. 
25 Damian Caluori 2005, “the Essential Functions of a Plotinian Soul,” Rhizai 2, no. 1 (2005): 75-94, at 
82.   
26 For the meaning of logos, see n. 34.  
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When the ensouled body is illumined by soul, one part of it participates in one way and one in another… 
so the power of eyes is called that of sight, the power in the ears that of hearing… that of touch in the 
whole body: for the whole body is sense-organ  to the soul for this perception. Since the organs of touch 
are in the first nerves, which also have the power to set the living being in motion because the appropriate 
soul-power communicates itself at this point, and since these nerves begin in the brain, they established 
the principle of perception and of impulse and in general of the whole living being in the brain, assuming 
that obviously that which was going to use the organs would be there where their beginnings were—but it 
would be better to say that the beginning of the actualization of the potency [of perception] is there… the 
beginning of its actualization at the point where organ begins. Since, then, the power of sensation which is 
also that of impulsion, belonging to the soul which perceives and imagines, has reason above it, as it were 
a nature in close contact on its underside with that which this is above, the ancients thus put reason at the 
highest point27 of the whole living creature at the head, supposing it to be not in the brain but in this 
perceptive faculty which in the way described above was situated in the brain.28  
        As anatomical researches advanced considerably in the time of Plotinus, the latter made use 
of these data in order to establish the claim that (the activity) of reason resides in the nerves 
situated in the brain. He accepts the idea that the nerves are responsible for perception, and since 
these nerves reside the in brain, the faculty which is going to use them (i.e. the reasoning faculty) 
would also be there where these nerves are found. In the following passage, Plotinus reworks the 
theory of the Platonic tripartite soul29, and locates the three parts (mere) in three distinct organs
of the body: 
For the perceptive part of the soul is in some way capable of judgement, and the imaging part has a sort of 
intelligence, and impulse and desire are there following the lead of the imaging faculty, and reason. The 
reasoning part therefore is there in the perceptive not as in a place but because that which is there draws 
upon it… The part of the soul too which we have in common with plants, which is responsible for growth 
and nutrition, is not absent from any part of the body, and since it nourishes blood by means of the blood, 
and the nourishing blood is in veins, and the starting point of veins and blood is in the liver,… For that 
which generates and nourishes and produces growth must necessarily also have an appetite for generation, 
nourishment and growth. But since the thin, light, quick, pure blood is the proper organ for the spirited 
part of the soul, the spring of this, the heart---for this is where blood of this kind is separated out… is… 
dwelling place… of the spirited part.30 
The “localization” of the faculties played an important role in the development of the 
theory of the internal senses, which will be discussed in detail in the concluding section of this 
essay. It may well be the case that it was due to the “localization” of the faculties of the soul that 
Plotinus came to distinguish various faculties from one another. Because if different faculties of 
27 Italics mine. 
28 Plotinus, Enneads 4.3.23.1-15 and 4.3.23.18-28. 
29 Henry J. Blumenthal, Plotinus’ Psychology: His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul (Martinus Nihjoff: the 
Hague, 1971), ch. 3. 
30 Plotinus, Enneads 4.3.23.30-48. 
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the soul reside in different organs of the body, as has been discovered through scientific research, 
then their functions too will be different from one another, as can be seen from the above 
citation. On the other hand, the reason for distinguishing different faculties may be due to the 
perceptual content of cognition, as it shows variation with respect to the analysis of the object 
perceived.  
       It should be noted that for Plotinus, perception is not an impression in the soul, so memory 
cannot be the preservation of an impression in the soul.31 The argument about the function of
memory is based on a thesis about the nature of soul, which Plotinus describes as the expression 
(logos)32 of ideas and perception.33 This thesis allows Plotinus to argue that the soul has objects
without having them as impressions or having been affected by them.34 That is why, Plotinus
argues that the soul has memory of things which it does not have, i.e., it has not ‘acquired’ them 
through experience or learning. This theory of memory is based on a notion of soul that is active 
both in perception and thought. In it, the content of memory possesses sensible and intelligible 
objects, that is, perceptions and innate ideas which do not have to be acquired by the soul since 
they are inherent in it.35 Plotinus states:
Memory, then, will belong to the image-making power, and remembering will be of things of the mental 
image kind…36 But one must understand memory not only in the sense of a kind of perception that one is 
remembering, but as existing when the soul is disposed according to what it has previously experienced or 
contemplated…37 So both perception and memory are a kind of strength. Further, when sense-perceptions 
31 A large number of studies exists on Plotinus’ views on memory, see e.g. Blumenthal, Plotinus’ 
Psychology, 80-89; E. W. Warren, “Memory in Plotinus,”  CQ 15 (1965): 252-260; Luc Brisson, “La 
place de la mémoire dans la psychologie plotinienne,” Etudes platoniciennes 3 (2006): 13-27; G. M. 
Hutchinson, “Apprehension of thought in Ennead 4.3.30,” The International Journal of the Platonic 
Tradition 5 (2011): 262–82; R. A. H. King, Aristotle and Plotinus on Memory (Berlin and New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2009); Dimitri Nikulin, “Memory and Recollection in Plotinus,” Archiv für Geschichte 
der Philosophie 96 (2014): 183–201. Among these studies King (2009) provides the most comprehensive 
study of Plotinus’ theory of memory and recollection.  
32 The word logos is always difficult to render given its multifaceted meanings, which vary from context 
to context. It refers to articulation, and the capacity to express thoughts and feelings in language, either 
through speech or internally. However, neither “speech” nor “reason” captures it fully, while “discourse” 
in English seems to have connotations of external activity. Therefore, it is left untranslated most of the 
time.  
33 Plotinus, Enneads 4.6.3.1. 
34 King, Aristotle and Plotinus on Memory, 111. 
35 Ibid., 114ff. 
36 Plotinus, Enneads 4.3.29.32-35. 
37 Ibid., 4.4.4.8-13. 
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are not impressions, how could memories be retentions of imprints which were never made [in the soul] at 
all? But if memory is a faculty and a preparation for readiness, why do we not come to recall the same 
things at once, but only later? Because one needs to set up the faculty, so to speak, and get ready.38 Thus, 
because memory is a faculty of and within the soul, memory belongs to the soul only, and not to the 
composite of the soul and body. 39  
In the above, Plotinus denies that memory belongs to the body because according to him 
the body is a hindrance to memory and causes forgetfulness.40 Moreover, memory is not
affection (pathos); it is rather a power/faculty, because, first, an image is an affection41 and
memory does not operate with images; and second, being affected is opposite of being capable of 
doing something.42 Memory is “strength” (ischus)43 that allows the soul to actualize and bring to
life what it had once thought or perceived. 
      In Plotinus’ hierarchy of realities (i.e. the One, the Intellect, and the Soul), an object of 
thinking/intellection (noema), on the one hand, is intellected by the intellect (nous) and is further 
represented in discursive thinking (dianoia) by the logos as an argument or verbal expression. 
The nous and the dianoia both know the intelligible, but whereas the former conceives it in a 
singular act, the latter apprehends it in a logical or verbal arrangement.44 The dianoetic object
can also be reflected as an imaginary representation (phantasma) in the imagination (phantasia, 
or image-making power, to phantastikon) capable of such representations. In Plotinus’ own 
words: 
Perhaps the reception into the image making power would be of the “logos” which accompanies the act of 
intelligence. The intellectual act is without parts and has not, so to speak, come out into the open, but 
remains unobserved within, but the logos unfolds its content and brings it out of the intellectual act into 
the image-making power, and so shows the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is 
apprehension and persistence and memory of it. Therefore, even though the soul is always moved to 
intelligent activity, it is when it comes to be in the image-making power that we apprehend it.45 
38 Ibid., 4.6.3.55-62. 
39 Ibid., 4.3.26.55-57. 
40 Ibid., 4.3.26.50-54. 
41 Ibid., 4.6.3.47ff. 
42 Ibid., 4.6.2.2ff. 
43 Ibid., 4.6.3.55. 
44 Ibid., 4.6.2.7-16. 
45 Ibid., 4.3.30.5-14. 
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       According to Plotinus, we become aware of our sensation and desires by apprehending the 
images that are formed in the faculty of the imagination (phantasia).46 Thus the object of
apprehension presents itself as an image. As for the higher cognition of the soul, we become 
conscious of our thoughts once logoi have unfolded their content and displayed them in the 
imagination like a mirror. Here the intentional object is a logos. What is important to note is that 
discursive reasoning unfolded by logoi are the external acts of the Forms in the Intellect. And 
insofar as they are the external acts of the Forms, they are images or traces. Hence, the logoi that 
unfold thoughts into the imagination are image-like. Plotinus uses the mirror metaphor elsewhere 
in the Enneads as well.47 He affirms that there is apprehension when thought rolls back, and the
activity according to the life of the “higher” soul is projected back, just as images are reflected 
on a bright, shiny mirror. According to Plotinus, when the mirror is tarnished or not in the right 
state, the image would be still there but its vision would be severely affected.48 In an analogous
manner, when the faculty of the imagination in us which reflects the images of reasoning and 
thought is undisturbed, it sees and knows them as it happens in the case of sense-perception1.49
As for the role of imagination in apprehending the sensibles, he states: 
For remembering is either thinking or imaging; and the image comes to the soul not by possession, but as 
it sees, so it is disposed; and if it sees sense-objects, it sinks low in proportion to the amount of them it 
sees. For because it possesses all things in a secondary way, and not so perfectly [as intellect]…50 (145). 
      So, an object of sensation (aisthema) is also equally represented or reflected in the 
imagination. The soul thus remembers and intellects both the sensible and the intelligible by 
recourse to imagination which is situated in the middle the two. For Plotinus, the imagination 
46 For the literature on the “imagination” in Plotinus, see, inter alia, John Dillon, “Plotinus and the 
Transcendental Imagination,”  in James Mackey (ed.), Religious Imagination (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1986); G. M. Hutchinson, “Apprehension of thought in Ennead 4.3.30,” The 
International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 5 (2011): 262–82; Anne Sheppard, “the Mirror of 
Imagination: the Influence of Timaeus 70eff,” Ancient Approaches to Plato’s Timaeus, University of 
London: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 78, (2003): 203-212; Edward Warren, 
“Imagination in Plotinus,” The Classical Quarterly 16, no. 2 (1966): 277-285. It is to be noted that this 
study has not treated the issue of “higher” versus “lower” imagination in Plotinus, since this is beyond the 
scope of present research. 
47 Plotinus, Enneads 1.4.10.21ff. Cf. Hutchinson, Apprehension of thought in Ennead. 
48 Hutchinson, Apprehension of thought in Ennead 4.3.30, 276. 
49 Plotinus, Enneads 1.4.10.6-16. 
50 Ibid., 4.4.3.8-12. 
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plays a crucial role in the apprehension of both the sensibles and the intelligibles. He holds that 
the imagination is responsible for presenting activities that occur in parts of the soul to the 
attention of the whole soul. 
4. Galen: Earliest Traces of the Internal Senses?
Galen was born in Pergamum in Greek-speaking Asia Minor in 129 CE, but spent most of his 
mature years (after 161 AD) in Rome, where he probably died, sometime after 200.51 His corpus
is wide-ranging comprising treatises on logic, anatomy, physiology, theory of the fundamental 
elements, disease classification, techniques of diagnosis and prognosis, therapeutics, ethics and 
finally, philosophical psychology. Galen also had a philosophical training, and his works shows a 
serious engagement with philosophy, which was for him both an additional accomplishment, to 
be taken seriously as his medical work, and something informing his scientific thought.  
        Galen does not present philosophical proofs for the existence of the soul; rather he takes it 
to be self-evident, and accepts that humans are a composite of body and soul.52 For Galen the 
rational soul is responsible for sensation and voluntary motion, and resides somewhere in the 
brain substance.53 In his psychology, the activities (which he equates with dunameis) of the soul
include the functions of imagination, reason and memory. However, it is important to note that 
these too are not located in any specific part of the brain. Galen states in his On the Doctrines of 
Hippocrates and Plato that the head houses “imagination and memory and recollection, 
knowledge and thought and ratiocination, and in its relation to the other parts of the animal to 
guide the sensation of the sensory parts and the motion of the parts that move voluntarily”.54 As
for the heart, however he claims that its function is “to provide the ‘tone’ of the soul,” and to 
51 For a brief and concise view on Galen’s life and works see P. N. Singer, Galen: Psychological Writings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1ff. 
52 For more information on this, see Pierluigi Donini, “Psychology” in R. J. Hankinson (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Galen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008), 184-209, esp. 184. 
53 See Christopher D. Green, “Where did the Ventricular Localization of Mental Faculties Come from?,” 
Journal of History of the Behavioral Sciences 39, no.2 (2003): 131–142; and Peter E. Pormann, 
“Avicenna on Medical Practice, Epistemology, and the Physiology of the Inner Senses,” in  Interpreting 
Avicenna, ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 91-108. 
54 Galen, On the doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (PHP), trans. P. de Lacy, (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 
1980), vol. 1, 440. 
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provide the boiling, as it were . . .” in states of passion.55 Finally, the liver is thought to be the
house of the faculty of nutrition and the “enjoyment of pleasures.”56 Thus, it is difficult to see a
“ventricular” localization of the faculties in Galen’s physiology. However, what is noteworthy in 
Galen’s psychology is not its all-encompassing scope but rather its plasticity that provided the 
space for speculative interpretation. Thus later thinkers—medical, philosophical or theological—
modified Galen’s distinction between the physiology of the ventricles and the activities of the 
rational soul, laying the groundwork for the placement of the imagination, reason, and memory 
within a separate ventricle, as we have seen in the case of Nemesius for example.57 Although the
concept of a formal ventricular localization is a significant feature of the developing dogma of 
Galenism, it is difficult to verify exactly when and by whom this localization came about.58
According to Aëtius of Amida (ca. 530–560 AD), the physician Posidonius of Byzantium (fl. end 
of the fourth century AD) apparently placed the imagination in the forepart of the brain, reason 
in the middle cavity and memory in the hind part of the brain.59 It is significant that Posidonius
was a contemporary of Nemesius in whom a more explicit “localization” theory is to be found, 
as observed in section II. However, Nemesius’ localization theory was somewhat different from 
that of Posidonius.60
        In what follows, Galen seems to suggest that perception takes place through some faculty 
which is “common” to all the senses, i.e. the external senses. Although he does not name it as 
“common sense,” it is very likely that he has in mind something of this kind. Citing the authority 
of Plato, he asserts that the external senses are the instruments of the body, and each sense-organ 
responsible for a particular sense-perception, viz., sight, hearing etc. cannot function in lieu of 
one another. That is to say, the sense-objects of hearing cannot be perceived through sight, and 
vice-versa. Still quoting Plato, Galen argues that if there is no common faculty that can perceive 
55 Ibid., 440-41. 
56 See also Green, Where did the Ventricular, 136. 
57 Julius Rocca, Galen on the Brain. Anatomical Knowledge and Physiological Speculation in the Second 
Century AD, (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 245ff. 
58 It has been suggested that Porphyry (232/3–c. 305 AD) invented the first theory of localization, see 
Rocca, Galen on the Brain, 246. 
59 Ibid., 245-246. 
60 J. Scarborough, “Symposium on Byzantine Medicine. Introduction”, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 38
(1984): ix–xvi. 
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different sense-data, e.g. speech and color simultaneously, then we would not be able to have any 
thoughts about them that are “common” to these data.  As he states: 
For that which first perceives, whatever it may be, is common to all the senses, as Plato teaches in other 
places and especially in the Theaetetus, in the part of the work where he says, “it would surely be strange, 
my young friend, if some large number of senses were seated in us as in wooden horses and if all these 
things did not reach to some one form, whether soul or whatever one should call it, by which we perceive, 
through the senses as instruments, all things that are perceptible.”… “These instruments through which 
you perceive things that are hot and hard and light and sweet, do you not say that each of them belongs to 
the body, or do you say that they belong to something else?—To nothing else. Would you also be willing 
to agree that the things you perceive through one faculty cannot be perceived through another, that the 
objects of hearing, for example, cannot be perceived through sight, or the objects of sight through 
hearing? … If, then, you have any thoughts about both sets of objects, your perception about both would 
not be made through the one sense organ, nor yet through another?... Consider speech and color: is not 
your first thought about them precisely this, that both exist?... And that each of the two is different from 
the other, but the same as itself?.... And that both taken together are two, but each by itself is one?... And 
are you able to observe whether they are unlike or like each other?... By what means do you have all these 
thoughts about them? For it is not possible to get either through sight or through hearing what is common 
to both. And here is still further evidence of the point we are making. If it were possible to ask whether 
both are salty or not, you know that you could tell me what instrument you would use in the inquiry, and 
this is obviously not sight or hearing,  but some other .—Of course, it will be another, the faculty that 
works through the tongue.—Very true. But through what does the faculty work  that tells you what is 
common not only to these objects of sense but to all, to which you apply the term ‘is’ and ‘is not,’ and the 
other terms that we used just now in our questions about them? For all of these, what kind of instruments 
will you name, through which the perceiving part of us perceives each one of them?”61 
Continuing the argument, he suggests that there is a “common faculty” (other than the five 
senses) that reaches from the brain through the nerves to each of the sense organs, and makes 
perception possible. He also describes the physiology of how this common faculty changes 
concurrently with the qualities specific to a particular organ of sense. In his own words: 
Here, as in the  passages that follow and in other dialogues, Plato taught us about the common faculty 
which reaches from the brain through the nerves to each of the sense organs and perceives the qualities in 
them, the implication being that if it had not been possible for any  but the luminous organ to change 
concurrently with the qualities peculiar to light, or any but the vaporous organ to change concurrently 
with the qualities peculiar to vapors, … or any but the organ that tastes and is full of juices with the 
qualities peculiar to moist bodies, the sense organs would not have come into being. But as things are, this 
is not the case.62  
       A large portion of On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato is devoted to refuting the 
Stoic view that “heart” is the seat of the principal part of the soul, i.e. the ruling part 
61 Galen, PHP, VII 6.4-27, trans. De Lacy. 
62 Ibid., 22-27 
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(hegemonikon).63 Galen writes that the Stoics concede that the ruling part is the source of
sensation and volition. Therefore, if they are to demonstrate that the heart contains within itself 
the ruling part, it should begin with the premise that it is this that initiates every voluntary 
movement in every other part of the animal, and that each sensation is referred to it. He then goes 
on to challenge the empirical basis of this claim. To show that the Stoic claim is contrary to 
evidence, Galen refers to the anatomical experiments which can prove with absolute certainty 
that the vessels which originate in the heart have no connection with the transmission of 
voluntary movement and sensation, which are rather to be assigned to nerves originated in the 
brain. Galen, then, summarizes his arguments as follows. He claims that both doctors and 
philosophers agree that “where the source of the nerves is, there too is the ruling part of the 
soul.” Now scientific experiments have shown decidedly that “the origin of the nerves is in the 
brain” in contrast to the Stoic claim that “the origin of the nerves is in the heart.” Therefore, the 
conclusion becomes easy to follow, i.e., the ruling part resides in the brain. As Galen writes: 
No Stoic or Peripatetic philosopher and no physician is as bold as before, and some, at least, have 
publicly changed over to the true account, the physicians admitting that the faculty of sensation and 
motion flows from the brain to all the animal’s members, and the philosophers that the reasoning part of 
the soul  is situated there. For they were put to shame when one of their two premises was clearly  refuted 
by dissection, the one that vitiated their reasoning when they used it  as their leading premise, adding to it 
the premise granted by all, that ‘Where the nerves have their source, there the governing part is’… They 
thought “nerves come from the heart”64 
       Galen assigns different faculties (dunameis) to the rational soul, which he locates in the 
brain, as noted earlier. In his view, these faculties are sense-perception, imagination, memory, 
and deliberate movement. He notes that some of these faculties are also shared by other animals. 
Here, he outlines a theory of action, involving the role of imagination and assent within the 
rational soul, which seems to apply also to animals.65 It is interesting to note that Galen
acknowledges that there is the intellect besides the rational soul, and also, his analogy of the 
intellect’s relation to the soul is revealing. According to Galen, the sensory faculty, by which he 
might have in mind “the common sense,” is that which notices all sorts of sensory changes in the 
body. Taking into account what he has said in the passage quoted from the PHP, it most likely 
63 Galen, PHP, esp. book III and IV. 
64 Galen, PHP VII.1, 1-6. 
65 Galen, Character Traits 45 Kr., 164, trans. in P. N. Singer (ed.), Galen: Psychological Writings (op. 
cit.). 
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refers to his notion of “the common sense.” As for “memory,” he rather defines it in an 
Aristotelian way, i.e., the faculty that retains the residue of sensory experience and is able to 
recall it subsequently: 
The rational soul is that to which the intellect stands in the same relationship as the eye to the body; it also 
has other capacities (dunameis) besides the intellect whose actions are evident: the capacity of sense 
perception, the capacity of imagination, the capacity of retention (memory), and the capacity by which 
deliberate movement comes about. The sensory capacity is that which notices the changes that occur in 
each one of the members of the body; then another capacity, whose function is that of retention (memory) 
and subsequent recall retains what the sensory capacity has noticed. Then thinking and scrutiny 
investigate many of the things that are pictured in the imagination when we want to scrutinize something 
to do with the arrangement of our well-being or our social intercourse or something to so with the 
sciences and or the arts. Then thought and scrutiny are followed by a decision upon one of the things 
investigated and examined by thought from among those which occur in the imagination.66 
Finally, Galen explains the imagination in the following manner: 
What I mean by ‘imagination’ is every movement that comes about in the soul of the sort that happens in 
it when a change occurs in the body. We sometimes incline towards this movement and decide to approve 
and accomplish it, and we sometimes refrain from that. If we incline towards it and decide upon it, and it 
is something that can be done, a longing to accomplish it is stirred up in us; if we do not incline towards it 
and do not decide upon it, but reject it and refrain from it, a revulsion from it is stirred up in us. If we 
neither decide upon it nor reject it, but either continue to scrutinize it or despair of attaining knowledge of 
it and abstain from it, we are affected by hesitation and uncertainty.67  
     It is notable that Galen describes the imagination in the above in terms of various movements 
that occurs in the soul. It is possible that he has in mind “imaginary” thoughts when discussing 
imagination rather than an image whose source may be some external sensation. In The 
Capacities of the Soul, Galen reiterates the rational soul’s different faculties.68 At first, he
clarifies the very notion of “dunamis,” noting that as long as we are ignorant of the substance of 
the active cause, we call it dunamis.69 In his view, faculties are to be understood in the sense of a
substance having different activities, e.g., aloe has a faculty/capacity of cleansing and toning 
mouth of the stomach.70 In likewise manner, he suggests that the soul has different faculties, each
responsible for a particular task. It is to be noted that the list of dunameis thus specified within 
66 Galen, Character Traits, 45 Kr., 164. 
67 Ibid., 165 
68 Galen, The Capacities of the Soul Depend on the Mixtures of the Body (QAM) 770 K., 377, trans. in 
Galen: Psychological Writings, op. cit. 
69 Galen, QAM, 34 M., 376-77. Note also that “dunamis” is translated as capacity in Singer, Galen: 
Psychological Writings. 
70 Ibid., 377. 
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 the soul appears differently at different places, e.g., in the PHP the list includes phantasia, 
anamnesis, mneme, episteme, noesis, and dianoesis.71 However, in the present context he
mentions perception, memory, and understanding72:
And in the same way, when we say: ‘the rational soul, seated in the brain, is capable of perceiving 
through the organs of perception, is capable of remembering the objects of perception of on its own, of 
seeing consequence and conflict in things, and their analysis and synthesis, we are not indicating anything 
different from what we would if we were to make the summary statement: ‘the rational soul has a number 
of capacities (dunameis): perception, memory, understanding, and each of the others.73  
Summary and Conclusion 
This study has attempted to trace the notion of the internal senses in three ancient authors. 
It started with Nemesius, and then by going backward ends with Galen. The textual evidence 
investigated in this study shows clearly that Galen, after acknowledging the Platonic tripartite 
soul, locates the various dunameis of the soul in the brain.74 However, it is to be noted that he
merely locates them in the substance of the brain, without being explicit as to whether they can 
be located in the “ventricles” of the brain. This conclusion is in line with the findings of 
Christopher Green, cited earlier in the article.75 According to Green, a full-fledged ventricular
theory is to be found in Nemesius. Before Nemesius, Galen contended that the mental faculties 
were located in the substance of the brain rather than in the ventricles. But it was only with 
Galenism, i.e. later philosophers who, using Galen’s anatomy as a point of departure, located the 
mental faculties in the ventricles themselves. The ventricular localization theory, in Green’s 
71 Galen, PHP, 438,27-440,8 De Lacy trans. See also Singer, Galen: Psychological Writings, 377. 
72 On “understanding” Galen states in De moribus (which survives only in the Arabic) that: 
“Understanding resides only in the rational soul, and is a faculty that perceives agreement and 
disagreement in all things.” XXXVIII, 212; cited in J. N. Mattock, “ A Translation of the Arabic Epitome 
of Galen’s Book Peri êthôn,” in Stern, Hourani and Brown (eds.), Islamic Philosophy and the Classical 
Tradition: Essays Presented by his Friends and Pupils to Richard Walzer on his Seventieth Birthday 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), 235-260 
73 Galen, QAM, 33 M., 377. 
74 See among others, Jacques Jouanna, Does Galen have a medical programme for intellectuals and the 
faculties of the intellect? in Christopher Gill et al. (eds.), Galen and the World of Knowledge (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 190-205, at 193. 
75 See nn 54 and 57. It should however be noted that unlike Green’s study, the central objective of this 
paper is not the localization of the mental faculties. 
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opinion, came together piece by piece over a period of time, probably not appearing fully in the 
form known to the Medieval world until the Middle Ages themselves. All in all, although the 
exact origin of the ventricular theory cannot be ascertained, the framework for the theory was 
established in the anatomical doctrines of Galen, which then gained its functional aspects 
gradually in the works of figures such as Posidonius, Nemesius, and Augustine. 
        Be that as it may, it seems intuitive enough, that the localization theory of Galen played a 
crucial role in paving the way for the foundation of the internal senses, which both Plotinus and 
Nemesius adapted. Just as with the external senses one can locate various sense-organs in 
different parts of the body, viz., touch, smell, sight etc., so too with the internal senses, thanks to 
Galen, one is able to locate them in various organs of the body. Thus philosophers are able to 
explain the role of all these different (internal) senses in their account of perception. However, it 
is important to note that none of the authors, studied in this paper, have really accounted for the 
epistemic justification of the internal senses that one finds much later, e.g. in Avicenna. Galen, 
although touches upon the philosophical aspect of things at times, was more concerned with the 
physiology of the internal senses rather than with their epistemological underpinnings. 
Moreover, Galen, unlike Plotinus, lacks a full-fledged theory of the soul, which would otherwise 
be able to explain all the different functions of the soul within a coherent system.  
      Coming now to Plotinus, it is undeniable that he benefitted much from Galen’s anatomical 
findings about the soul, which also helped him refute the Stoic doctrine of the soul, with its 
ruling part in the heart.76 However, it is clear that the difference between the Galenic and the
Plotinian conceptions of the internal senses is, nonetheless, great. Although it might be the case 
that the Galenic localization of the internal senses had prompted Plotinus to distinguish each 
internal sense, it is important to note that for the latter, the “activities” of the soul are present in 
the brain, not the soul itself. But Plotinus makes use of Galen’s findings about nerves to establish 
the claim that the ruling part of the soul is in the brain, and that the soul must require a ruling 
part in order to generate perception and meaningful understanding. Also, the notion of the ruling 
part stems from the idea that the soul is like a craftsman and parts of the body are its 
instruments.77 That being said, Plotinus does not seem to expand on the common sense, as does
76 Blumenthal, Plotinus’ Psychology, 75ff. 
77 See Galen, On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body 1.2, tans. M. T. May. 
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Galen. Also, Galen’s conception of memory and imagination does not deal the “aporiae” 
concerning them, as one finds them in Plotinus.  
      As for Nemesius, he is to be credited for explicitly assigning a place for each internal sense. 
That is to say, he located them in the ventricles of the brain. Like Plotinus, he too recognizes the 
role of memory and imagination in perception. Also, similar to Galen, he states that memory 
preserves the residue of external sensation. But there was no detailed account of all the problems 
that Plotinus identified with memory or the imagination as they relate to sense-perception.78
However, Nemesius does explicitly state that the soul has faculties, and these are thought, 
memory and the imagination. In this way, he contributed further to the development of the theory 
of the internal senses as it took shape in later centuries.  
Muhammad U. Faruque 
University of California, Berkeley 
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